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NOTES

When Concerted Conduct Leads to Misuse:
An Examination of the Federal Circuit's En Banc
Holding in Princo
JerradT Howard
INTRODUCTION

is both curious and deeply troubling that, in an age of intellectual
property ("IP") expansionism, the one doctrine explicitly concerned
with limiting IP overreaching has no coherent basis in IP policy."' This
succinct statement details the tragedy that plagues the patent misuse
doctrine in its current state.
The doctrine was originally developed to rein in abusive conduct
of patent holders. Though the doctrine initially was applied widely by
courts, academics today question the continuing validity of even a narrow
application of the doctrine.3 In fact, many believe the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeal's en banc holding in Princo Corp. v. IT 4 places a final nail
in the doctrine's coffin and indicates that the once powerful defense is now
a superfluous remnant of our country's jurisprudence.'
The misuse doctrine, born a creature of patent law and modeled after
the doctrine of unclean hands, was an affirmative defense intended to
prevent further monopolization-either temporally or physically-than
4J IT

I

I Juris Doctor, May 2012, University of Kentucky College of Law; BS in Accounting and
BA in Political Science, summa cum laude, May 2009, University of Kentucky.
2 Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse at Foreclosure,96 IowA L. REV. 475, 476 (zo I I) (citation
omitted).
3 See Robert J. Hoerner, Patent-Antitrust:Dead orAlive?PatentMisuse: Portentsforthe 99os,
59 ANTITRUST L.J. 687 (199I).
4 Princo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 616 F3d 1318, 1329-30 (Fed. Cir. 201o)
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 248o (2o I).

(en banc),

5 See KEVIN M. BOLAN & STEFAN M. MEISNER, EN BANC FEDERAL CIRCUIT ADDRESSES

(20io), available at http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.
nldetail/objectjid/Ie347aez-8876-45ac-8cd7-563b475c813.cfm ("A majority of the Federal
Circuit appears to be increasingly suspicious of the [patent misuse] doctrine's vitality .... ");
see also Eric Bensen, Bensen on the PatentMisuse: Princo Corp. v. ITC, EMERGING ISSUES (LexisNexis), Oct. 2010 ("[Dlefendants asserting misuse as a defense have not faired [sic] well in
recent years in appellate decisions .... ").
PATENT MISUSE
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that already allowed by the United States government in the Patent Act.6
The main premise behind the doctrine was that "[hie who uses his patent
to obtain protection from competition in the sale of unpatented materials
extends by contract his patent monopoly to articles as [sic] respects which
the law sanctions neither monopolies nor restraints of trade."7 A condition
placed upon the licensing of a patent is not prima facie misuse; rather, only
those conditions that derive some value to which the patent holder was
not entitled from the initial monopoly qualify.8 The result of a defendant
proving patent misuse in an infringement action is that a patent is rendered
temporarily unenforceable, though not void, until the effects of such misuse
are no longer present in the market.'
Though this doctrine could have developed into a very strong element
of patent law-an element that is sorely needed to rein in improper patent
practices-recent court applications have inherently decimated its value.
While patent misuse was created by the Supreme Court as a general
affirmative defense to a claim of infringement, today's courts maintain
that the patent misuse doctrine was always intended to be narrow in
application. 0 With very few exceptions, patent misuse has been limited
to infringement cases." Ironically, the Princo decision comes at a time

6 Bohannan, supra note 2, at 477; see also Thomas E Cotter, Misuse, 44 Hous. L. REv. 901,
(stating that "misuse is a defense to a claim of patent or copyright infringement..
. [claiming that the] plaintiff has attempted to broaden the scope of. her intellectual property
rights (IPRs) with an anticompetitive effect"). "The classic case [of patent misuse] involved
the tying of patented and unpatented goods - that is, the seller's requirement that one could
not purchase or lease the patented product without also taking unpatented products or services as well." Bohannan, supra note 2, at 476; see, e.g., Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp.,
283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931) (demonstrating patent misuse when plaintiff would only license his
patented machine if the defendant would agree to purchase unpatented dry ice to use in the
machine from plaintiff).
7 Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 644 (i947); see also
Princo Corp., 616 E3d at 1327 (stating "the Supreme Court established the basic rule of patent
misuse: that the patentee may exploit his patent but may not 'use it to acquire a monopoly not
embraced in the patent' (citing Transparent-WrapMach. Corp., 329 U.S. at 643)); Burlotte v.
Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33-34 (1964) (holding that the doctrine's reasoning applies equally to
exacting royalties in a contract after a patent has expired).
8 Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181 (1938) (stating "[p]atent
owners may grant licenses extending to all uses or limited to use in a defined field"). Such
conditions which limit the field of the license are in stark contrast to those which are patent
misuse. Cf.Princo Corp., 616 F3d at 1329 (drawing the line of distinction between valid conditions and those items which violate public policy, such as "price-fixing conditions and tying
restraints").
9 Robert J. Hoerner, PatentMisuse: The Law Changes,J. PROPRIETARY RTS., Feb. 1989, at 1o.
1o PrincoCorp., 616 F.3d at 1321 (stating that "patent misuse is a judge-made doctrine..
[that] has not [been] applied ... expansively").
i i For instance, the defense of misuse is available in a contract dispute involving the
breach of a patent licensing agreement. See Bohannan, supranote 2, at 477-78 (citing Thys Co.
v. Brulotte, 382 P.2d 271 (Wash. 1963)).
901 (2007)
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when some argue that the patent system has become a "hindrance . . .
to innovation" and that the "Federal Circuit ... [is] ma[king] it easier to
2
enforce the rights conferred by the acquisition of a patent."1
It is the purpose of this Note to establish that the recent Princo en
banc opinion violates the spirit and primary policy behind the patent
misuse doctrine. Although the Supreme Court denied Princo's petition for
certiorari, 3 this Note advocates a reversal of the en banc holding and a wider
application of the patent misuse doctrine in an attempt to eliminatecurrent
abusive practices.
Part I will review the Federal Circuit's en banc majority, concurring,
and dissenting opinions in Princo, while Part II discusses the historical
development of the misuse doctrine and whether the recent restriction
of the doctrine is appropriate in light of the Supreme Court's continued
expansion of and Congress's limited actions to cabin the doctrine. Part III
discusses the en banc's new insurmountable legal standard for misuse, the
standard that should be applied in misuse cases, and why the underlying
policies of the patent misuse doctrine serve as a basis for a more expansive
doctrine than that proposed by the Federal Circuit. This Note concludes
that the patent misuse doctrine should have a more expansive application
than currently accepted by the Federal Circuit and, specifically, that the
doctrine should apply to the type of conduct alleged as patent misuse
in Princo, so as to eliminate abuse of the patent system undermining the
purpose of the Patent Clause.
I.

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT's EN BANc HOLDING IN PRINCO

Princo Corp.v. ITC has a long and complicated history, primarily because
the litigation has been active for many years, already resulting in several
pivotal holdings. 14 This Note, however, is limited to only those issues
presented in the recent en banc opinion-that is, whether the Federal
Circuit majority was correct in concluding that Philips's actions did not in
fact constitute patent misuse.
The infringement action involved two patents owned by Philips
Corporation, collectively referred to as the Raaymakers patents;"5 the
patents claimed a method for encoding data on the particular grooves of a

12 Marshall Leaffer, PatentMisuse and Innovation, IoJ. HIGH. TCH. L. 142, I43-44 (2o 10).
13 Princo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 131 S. Ct. 2480 (201i) (denying Princo's certiorari
petition). For a copy of Princo's certiorari petition, see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Princo
Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, No. io-898 (Jan. 5, 2011), 2011 WL 86647.
14 See generally David F. Ryan, Princo v. ITC and the FTC's RadicalAnalytical Framework,
PATENTLYO, I (Mar. I, zoio), http://www.patentlyo.com/princo.davidfryan.pdf (discussing the
history of the case and prior holdings).
15 The Raaymakers patents are U.S. Patent No. 4,999,825 (filed Nov. 1, 1988) and U.S.
Patent No. 5,023,856 (filed Mar. 28, 199o). Both patents are expired.
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CD-R/RW utilizing analog methods.16 The Raaymakers patents eventually
became part of an industry standard, termed the Orange Book, which
was developed as a result of a joint venture between Philips and Sony. 7
The Orange Book resulted in a very successful licensing program through
which various patents necessary to create industry-compatible CD-R/
RWs were pooled into a single tying arrangement." Also included in the
Orange Book was the Lagadec patent, 9 which claimed an alternative
method for encoding CD-R/RW discs utilizing digital technology. 0 The
Lagadec patent was developed independently and patented by Philips's
competitor, Sony."' Today, all CD-R/RW compact discs follow the Orange
Book specifications. 2
Princo was initially a licensee of the Orange Book patent pool, but
eventually stopped paying royalty fees to Philips. Philips filed suit, alleging
infringement of the Raaymakers patents because Princo continued to
utilize the technology despite the lapse of the license agreement. Princo
pled the affirmative defense of patent misuse under the theory that Philips
had utilized the Raymaakers patents to form a horizontal conspiracy with
Sony, with the end result being the suppression of the Lagadec patent;
this, Princo claimed, prevented the Lagadec patent from becoming a viable
alternative, competing technology to the Raaymakers patents. 3
In the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals' original holding, the panel
determined that the relationship between Sony and Philips did not equate
to an illegal tying arrangement constituting misuse. 4 Specifically, the court
held that it was reasonable for Philips to believe the Lagadec patent was
I6 Princo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 616 F3d 1318, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 248o (2011).
17 Id.
18 See James Love & James Kulbaski, Federal Circuit Issues Decision in Princo En Banc
Rehearing, ITC 337 LAw BLOG (Sept. 3, zoio), http://www.itcblog.com/2o1oo9o3/federalcircuit-issues-decision-in-princo-en-banc-rehearing (discussing the underlying pooling
agreement). But see Ryan, supra note 14, at 4 n. 1o (noting that it is "technically incorrect to
refer to the Orange Book licensing program as a 'patent pool', [sic] since there was no 'pooling'
of the underlying patents under the ownership of a single licensing entity").
19 The Lagadec Patent is U.S. Patent No. 4,942,565 (filed July 28, 1989). The Lagadec
patent has also expired.
20 Princo Corp., 616 F3d at 1322. Butsee Ryan, supra note 14, at 5 (stating that "claim [six]
of Lagadec was sufficiently broad to read [in] ...the Raaymakers technology").
21 Princo Corp;, 616 F3d at 1322.
22 Ryan, supra note 14, at 5.
23 See Princo Corp., 616 F 3 d at 1325 (noting that Princo Corp. v. Int7 Trade Comm'n, 563
E3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009) [hereinafter Princo1], did not address Princo's allegation that "Philips and Sony agreed to suppress the Lagadec technology" or the anticompetitive ramifications
of such an agreement); see also Ryan, supra note 14, at 2 n.7 (stating that "[tihe actual terms
of the arrangements between Sony and Philips regarding the Lagedec patent cannot be discerned from the public record").
24

Princo I,
supra note 23, at

1312.
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a blocking patent and thus was "an essential patent for purposes of the
Orange Book pool.""5 The court concluded, however, that if Sony and Philips
had engaged in patent pooling in an attempt to suppress a commercially
viable alternative technology from ever developing, then such behavior
would constitute patent misuse.16 Princo 's holding was limited, stating
that agreements between competitors may be acceptable and deemed
pro-competitive even if the patent is only arguably blocking.2 7 The court
reasoned that "[niot only will judicial economy be served and litigation costs
reduced by settling such disputes, but the delay and uncertainty associated
with blocking patent disputes may prevent either party from going forward
with a commercial product for years."2 8 Whether such an agreement existed
and whether the Lagadec patent could be considered a commercially
viable alternative technology both remained issues for the International
Trade Commission to determine on remand. 9 Though Philips, Princo, and
the ITC all petitioned for rehearing, the Federal Circuit only accepted
Philips's and the ITC's petitions to address whether such an agreement
between Philips and Sony could in fact constitute patent misuse.3"
The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed its initial holding in
Pinco I and ruled that the alleged horizontal agreement could not be the
basis of a claim of patent misuse, stating that even if such an agreement
existed it "had no bearing on the physical or temporal scope of the patents
in suit, nor did it have anticompetitive effects in the relevant market."3
The Federal Circuit based its decision on both a narrow interpretation of
the patent misuse doctrine32 as well as the Patent Licensing Reform Act,
which the court viewed as Congress's attempt to "cabin" the patent misuse
doctrine, 33 The court's primary reasoning for rejecting Princo's allegations
25 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n,
424 E3d 1179, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). "[A] blocking patent is one that at the time of the license
an objective manufacturer would believe reasonably might be necessary to practice the technology at issue." Id. at 1310.
26 Id.at 1318-19.
27 See id.at 1310 (quoting 3 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST, § 3.3, at 36
(2d ed. 2009)). It appears Princo Iand Hovenkamp support the conclusion that even if patents
are not blocking at all, the underlying agreement to suppress the competing technology would
be acceptable.
z8 Id.

29

Id. at

1321.

30 Princo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 616 F3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cit. zoO) (en banc),
cert.denied, 131 S. Ct. 248o (zoi I).
31 Id.at 1340.
32 Id. at 1329 ("Recognizing the narrow scope of the doctrine, we have emphasized that
the defense of patent misuse is not available to a presumptive infringer simply because a
patentee engages in some kind of wrongful commercial conduct, even conduct that may have
anticompetitive effects." (citing C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1373 (Fed. Cit.
1998))).
33 Id. at 1329-30 (citing Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 201
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of patent misuse was that Philips did not assert that the Lagadec patent was
infringed in the underlying action; therefore, because the Lagadec patent
was not the patent in suit, an agreement to suppress technology covered by
that patent could not be the subject of the misuse defense.-'
The Federal Circuit also made clear the patent misuse doctrine
requires a defendant demonstrate that the patentee's actions yield
anticompetitive effects.35 This would have required Princo prove that "if
Sony's (Lagadec patent] were not included in the licenses, Sony likely
would have developed technologies that competed against the Orange
Book standard in a relevant market,"36 and that such misuse resulted in
"anticompetitive effects necessary to condemn that agreement under ruleof-reason analysis." 37 The court also found no evidence in the record that
the patents were close substitutes or that the pool licensors would have
competed in the technology licensing market. 3 Underlying the Federal
Circuit's holding also was its reliance on the ITC's prior conclusions that
the Lagadec technology did not work well and could not compete with the
39
Orange Book technology.
In addition, two concurring members of the en banc panel found that
a finding of patent misuse was not appropriate because Princo failed to
prove the existence of any agreement with anticompetitive effects. 4° These
panel members felt that failure to meet this burden was dispositive, and
thus refused to render any judgment on the scope of the patent misuse
doctrine.4 In fact, the concurrence criticized both the majority and
(198o)) (referring to 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2oo6)). In particular, the court believed Congress's
intent behind section 27 1(d) "was [to address] concern[ I about the open-ended scope of the
doctrine and [therefore] sought to confine it to anticompetitive conduct by patentees who
leverage their patents to obtain economic advantages outside the legitimate scope of the patent grant." Id. at 1331.
34 Id. at 1331. "What [patent misuse] requires, at minimum, is that the patent in suit
must 'itself significantly contribute[ I to the practice under attack."' Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Kolene Corp. v. Motor City Metal Treating, Inc., 44o Fd 77, 8S (1971)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
35 Id. at 1334.
36 Id. at 1338 (alteration in original).
37 Id. at 1340; see also Crowell & Moring, Federal Circuit's En Banc Princo Decision

Limits Patent Misuse Doctrine, ANTITRUST L.

ALERT

(Sept.

2,

2oio), http://www.crowell.com/

NewsEvents/Newsletter.aspx?id= I So (stating that the court affirmed "that a claim of patent
misuse requires proof that the patentee's conduct resulted in anticompetitive effects").
Crowell and Moring also note that this is interesting given that the court's analysis seems to
indicate that any future successful patent misuse cases will establish an antitrust claim. Id.
38 Princo Corp., 616 F3d at 1324. Some authors have claimed that Sony's Lagadec patent
was merely an inferior alternative technology "that was rejected by the two joint venturers on
technical grounds." Ryan, supra note 14, at 5.
39 Princo Corp., 616 F.3d at 1326.
40 Id. at 1340 (Prost, J., concurring).
41 Id. at 1341.
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dissenting opinions, stating they "doubt that the doctrine is as narrow or
expansive as each respectively suggests. '4 Additionally, the concurrence
takes exception to the majority's view that antitrust and patent misuse
issues are mutually exclusive, suggesting instead that use of a patent which
violates antitrust law also seems to suggest the patent owner has misused
their patent. 43 The concurrence also refused to side with the dissent's
argument as well, claiming the argument was unpersuasive because "the
dissent does not address how a patent owner's right to exclude others from
using the invention could ... affect the calculus in the antitrust and patent
44
misuse contexts."
Two dissenting judges claimed that the majority's opinion directly
contradicts the Supreme Court's view of patent misuse, stating the majority's
opinion "emasculate[d] the doctrine so that it will not provide a meaningful
obstacle to patent enforcement. '4 The dissenters focused primarily on the
Supreme Court's recent opinion in Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink,
Inc. 6 and heavily criticized the result of the majority's opinion: a deeply
weakened patent misuse doctrine with limited application, if not outright
judicial abolishment of the doctrine. 47 In discussing the majority's view
that the Lagadec patent was not the patent in suit, the dissent argued that,
under current law, the agreement between Philips and Sony made the two
patents "parrand parcel of the same course of conduct designed to protect
the Raaymakers patents from competition from the alternative Lagadec
technology" and therefore the improper use of the Lagadec patents
48
constituted misuse of the Raaymakers patents as well.
The dissent focused on an antitrust analysis, examining the
anticompetitive effects of the agreement between Philips and Sony. 9
Though the dissent conceded that the burden of proving patent misuse
rested on Princo, it believed that Princo's satisfied its burden by establishing
an agreement to suppress competitive technology existed." The dissent
also believed that no industry analysis was necessary to demonstrate the
anticompetitive nature of the arrangement between Sony and Philips
because the relationship was "inherently suspect."'"
In addition, the dissent attacked the majority's requirement that the
Id. at 1340.
43 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
44 Id. at 1340-41 (emphasis in original).
45 Id. at 1341-42 (Dyk, J., dissenting); Ryan Davis, Fed. Circ.Narrows Scope of PatentMisuse Defense, L. 360 (Aug. 30, 20o), www.law36o.com/web/articles/19o264.
46 Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42 (2oo6).
42

47
48
49
50
51

Princo Corp., 616 F3d at 1341-42.
Id. at 1346 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 1353.
Id. (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, io9 (1984)).
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technology must have been shown to be commercially viable.5" Though
the two panelists concluded that "proof ... the Lagadec technology could
never become commercially viable might be sufficient to defeat an antitrust
violation," the dissent noted that the ITC found only that the Lagadec
technology's viability was merely "doubfful."53 The dissent condemned the
result of the majority opinion as "fail[ing] to provide adequate protection
against the suppression of nascent technology, and allow[ing] patent
holders free rein to prevent the development of potentially competitive
technologies. 54
The en banc opinion in Princo has met mixed reviews among
practitioners and academics alike. Some practitioners have hailed the
opinion as "underscor[ing] the broad protection afforded patent holders
when licensing their patents."55 The holding has also been revered as adding
much needed clarification to the patent misuse doctrine56 by establishing
a clearer delineation between patent misuse and the antitrust arenas.5 7
Alternatively, some feel the majority's opinion has serious limitations in its
applicability-the broad brushstrokes of the Federal Circuit may not apply
in other cases where clearer facts establish a similar agreement.5" Others
have noted that the court's holding provides protection for entities that
conspire to suppress technologies from a claim of misuse, even though such
conduct could constitute antitrust violations.5 9
Scholars immediately predicted that the hard lines drawn by the court's
factions would ensure that the en banc opinion would not be the final word
on the matter.60 However, the Supreme Court denied Princo's certiorari
petition in May 2011, so, it seems the Federal Circuit's en banc opinion will
61
be the last word on the issue for the time being.

52
53
54
55

Id. at 1356.

Id. at 1357 (emphasis added).
Id.
Crowell & Moring, supra note 37.
56 BOLAN & MEISNER, supra note 5 ("Some commentators have hailed the majority opinion in Princo as providing clearer instructions to patent pool administrators about how to structure their licensing activity ... .
57 Crowell & Moring, supra note 37 ("While patent misuse is often thought of as co-extensive [sic] with antitrust, Princoconfirms otherwise.").
58 See BOLAN & MEISNER, supranote 5 ("It is conceivable that an accused infringer with a
more substantial factual record might be able to prove some enlargement of the patent scope
and an anticompetitive effect under traditional antitrust rule-of-reason analysis based on the
same alleged conduct.").
59 Dennis Crouch, FederalCircuitHolds-Line on Patent Misuse Defense, PATENTLYO (Aug.
30, 2OIO), http://www.patentlyo.com/patentlzoio/o8/federal-circuit-holds-line-on-patentmisuse-defense.html.
60 BOLAN &MEISNER, supra note 5; Christopher Norton, Princo Takes PatentMisuse Case to
Supreme Court, L. 360 (Jan. 20, 201 i), http://www.law36o.com/ip/articles/z2I159.
61 Princo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 131 S. Ct. 248o (201 i) (denying Princo's certiorari
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HISTORICAL APPLICATION BY THE COURTS AND CONGRESS'S INTENT IN
SECTION 271(D)

A. The Supreme Court Has Continuously Expandedthe PatentMisuse Doctrine.
The majority opinion claimed that the doctrine of patent misuse
"has largely been confined to a handful of specific practices by which
the patentee seemed to be trying to extend his patent grant beyond its
statutory limits. ' 62 This narrow interpretation, however, is not a product of
the Supreme Court, but rather an idea generated by the Federal Circuit
itself.63 What the majority fails to recognize is that the Supreme Court
has continuously expanded the patent misuse doctrine throughout its
jurisprudence in an attempt to rein in anticompetitive conduct and abuse
of intellectual property laws.
The doctrine was first mentioned in a 1917 Supreme Court decision
involving tying":
[T]he essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement
lies in the seller's exploitation of its control over the tying

product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product
that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred

petition). See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Princo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, No.
o---898 (Jan. 5,2011), 2o1 WL 86647.

62 Princo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 6 16 E3d 13 18, 1329-30 (Fed. Cit. 2010) (en banc),
cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2480 (201 1)(citing USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.zd 505,510 (7th
Cir. 1982)).
63 Rather than supporting its opinion with Supreme Court precedent, the Federal Circuit instead cites non-binding precedent from other circuits: "[riecognizing the narrow scope
of the doctrine, we have emphasized that the defense of patent misuse is not available to a presumptive infringer simply because a patentee engages in some kind of wrongful commercial
conduct...." Princo Corp., 616 E3d at 1329 (emphasis added) (citing Kolene Corp. v. Motor
City Metal Treating, Inc., 44o E2d 77, 84-85 (6th Cir. 197r); McCullough Tool Co. v. Well
Surveys, Inc., 395 F.2d 230, 238-39 (ioth Cir. 1968)). Scholars have also recognized that the
Federal Circuit, rather than the Supreme Court, is responsible for the narrowing of the patent misuse doctrine. See, e.g., Geoffrey D. Oliver, Princo v. International Trade Commission:
Antitrust Law and the Patent Misuse Doctrine ParrCompany, ANTITRUST, Spring 2011, at 62 ("The
en banc decision in Princo is the third in a series of decisions arising from a single ITC patent
infringement investigation... [that] continu[e] the Federal Circuit's trend over the past twentyfive years of narrowing the patent misuse doctrine." (emphasis added)).
64 See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917)

(finding patent misuse where motion picture projector manufacturer placed notice on projector saying that the machine could not be used for films other than those made with the
permission of the manufacturer). For additional examples of the Supreme Court's'application
of the patent misuse doctrine in tying cases, see, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States,
337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv.Co., 320 U.S. 661, 664-66
(1944). For recent applications of the patent misuse doctrine, see Blough v. Holland Realty,
Inc., 574 F3d io84, IO88-89 (9th Cir. 2009); U.S. Ring Binder L.P. v. World Wide Stationary
Mfg. Co., 3:o CV 2556, 201 1 WL 3648289, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 19, 2oiI); In reWebkinz
Antitrust Litig., 695 E Supp. zd 987, 995 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
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to purchase elsewhere on different terms. 6s
In its initial application of the patent misuse doctrine, the Court held
that a patentee could not condition the granting of a patent license on
the licensee's use of the patented item with items that were not a part of
the patent in suit. 66 "This decision marked the beginning of an extended
period of development and fairly aggressive application of the patent
67
misuse doctrine."
In 1931, the Court extended the application of the patent misuse
doctrine to contributory infringement actions. 6s This extension blocked a
patent holder from requiring that a licensee purchase "unpatented materials
used in connection with the invention ... only from the licensor. ' 69 The
Supreme Court expanded the doctrine further in 1964 to prevent a licensor
from requiring a licensee to contract temporally beyond the protection
period afforded by registration.7 °
The Supreme Court has only accepted a reduction in the application
and analysis-not the scope-of the patent misuse doctrine when Congress
prescribed the reduction. After Congress enacted section 271(d), the Court
recognized that tying agreements can have pro-competitive justifications
and thus rejected its prior notion that a "patent equals market power."'" In
addition, this minor change in precedent is not at all shocking when one
considers the similar abolishment of per se rules in the antitrust regime
over the past thirty years. 72 When considering this slight diminution in
the application of the misuse doctrine, it seems that the Federal Circuit's
original holding remanding the case for a factual determination of whether
market dominance existed was the correct resolution.
What is missing from the Supreme Court's jurisprudence is the Federal
Circuit's "leveraging" requirement-a requirement that the defendant
show the patent in suit has been leveraged in some manner to extend the
scope of his monopoly. In fact, Supreme Court precedent indicates that this

65 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.

2

v. Hyde, 466 U.S.

2, 12

(1984).

66 Id.
67 Oliver, supranote 63, at 62-63.

68 Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
69 Id. at 3i.
70 Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29,33-34 (1964).
71 I11.
Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S.

z8, 44-46

(2oo6); 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)

(zoo6).
72 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007)
(reversing Supreme Court precedent that vertical price restraints areperseillegal); Bus. Elecs.
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988) (affirming "a presumption in favor of a
rule-of-reason standard," instead of one using "formalistic distinctions"); Cont'l T V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977) (concluding that a per se rule cannot be based
on a distinction between sale and non-7sale transactions).
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leveraging requirement is not required to establish misuse. 3
In light of the Supreme Court's continued expansion of the doctrine,
"[c]ourts [generally] have applied the patent misuse doctrine in response
to practices that they perceive[ ] to be inequitable or unfair attempts
to extend the scope of patents" and which are outside the scope of the
antitrust regime. 4 Thus, the Court's precedent and the lower courts'
application of the misuse doctrine are far less stringent than the Federal
Circuit would currently admit.7" Though the Court's application has been
slightly modified as a result of the Patent Licensing Reform Act, the crux
of the doctrine remains unscathed-any arrangement that improperly
expands the patent monopoly constitutes patent misuse.76 The doctrine
should continue to be applied as the Supreme Court intended and not in
the emasculated form into which the Federal Circuit has forced it.
B. Congress Has Only Defined What Does Not ConstitutePatentMisuse in Section
271(d).
The Federal Circuit majority also grounds its assertion of a narrow
doctrine in what the court claims was the legislative intent of section
271(d)-that is, the statute was intended "not to broaden the doctrine of
' 77
patent misuse, but to cabin it."
Contrary to the court's reasoning, Congress has only defined some
specific activities that do notconstitute patent misuse in section 271(d).7 8As
such, section 271(d) is not nearly as broad as the majority advocates. What
the majority cannot deny, although they try, is that section 271(d) does not
prevent, or even address, a finding of misuse for concerting competitors
who suppress potentially viable and competitive technology. Rather, the
crux of the statutory provision is that it eliminates any per se presumption
79
that ownership of a patent equals market power.
The legislative history of section 271 (d) also contains no support for the
en bane Federal Circuit's application in Princo.0 In fact, the legislative history
expressly states that the purpose of the modification is to "eliminat[e] ... a

73 United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251-52 (stating that "the particular
form or method by which the monopoly is sought to be extended is immaterial").
74 Oliver, supra note 63, at 63 (citing Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 Ed 1566,
1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (refusing to enforce patent where patentee charged royalty fees from
both licensee and purchaser, thus violating the doctrine of patent exhaustion).
75 BOLAN & MEISNER, supra note 5.
76 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,401 (1948).
77 Princo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 616 E3d 1318, 1329-30 (Fed. Cir. 2oo) (en banc),
cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2480 (2011).

78 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006); Princo Corp., 616 E3d at 1329.
79 II1.Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42-43 (2oo6).
8o See 134 Cong. Rec. Hio,647 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
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per se or automatic inference of patent misuse from certain tying practices"
and for refusals to use or license a particular patent. 8' The legislative history
makes no mention of any intent of the enacted statute to insulate any other
conduct from a claim of misuse. Additionally, it should be noted that Senate
Bill 438 originally sought to intertwine the patent misuse doctrine with
antitrust laws; however, the final version of the Patent Misuse Reform Act
did not include these similar provisions to Senate Bill 438, indicating that
Congress never intended that the patent misuse doctrine would become
entirely superfluous against the antitrust regime.8"
As already stated, Princo I concluded with a remand to the ITC for a
determination of whether patent misuse existed, which required that
the ITC find Philips maintained sufficient market power in the relevant
industry. Thus, the initial holding comported with section 271(d). Congress
makes no specific mention of the type of concerted activities at play in
Princo. In fact, as the dissent correctly pointed out, conduct similar to that
alleged by Princo is defined as patent misuse in the legislative history.83
Therefore, the Princo majority's reliance on section 271(d) as a basis for a
narrowing of the patent misuse doctrine is misguided.
III.

RESHAPING THE PATENT MISUSE

DOCTRINE TO COVER HORIZONTAL

CONSPIRACIES SIMILAR TO THAT ALLEGED IN PRINCO

"[P]atent misuse is ...

grounded in a broad policy-based desire to

prevent a patentee from using the patent to obtain [a] market benefit beyond
that which inheres in the statutory patent right."' 4 The majority in Princo
interpreted this broad policy as requiring the patent be leveraged in some
manner, "i.e., the use of the patent power to impose overbroad conditions
on the use of the patent in suit"85 in an attempt "to exact concessions from
a licensee that are not fairly within the ambit of the patent right."8 6 This
policy indicates a broad application of the misuse doctrine.
In contrast, however, the Federal Circuit's definition of what conduct
8z Id. at Hio,648.
82 See id. at H 1o,647; Richard Calkins, PatentLaw: The Impact of the 1988 PatentMisuse Reform Act and Noerr-PenningtonDoctrine on Misuse Defenses andAntitrust Counterclaims,38 DRAKE
L. REv. '75, 192-200 (1989).
83 Princo Corp., 616 F3d at 1350-51. The legislative history specifically mentions that
patent misuse includes conduct that, similar to horizontal conspiracies, constitutes antitrust
violations, including price fixing, covenants not to compete, resale price maintenance, and
grant-back licenses. 134 Cong. Rec. Hio,6 4 7 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier). In addition, there is nothing in the Congressional Record indicating that the list
provided by Representative Kastenmeier is intended to be exhaustive.
84 PrincoCorp., 616 F3d at 1328 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Mallinckrodt,
Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
85 Id. at 1331.
86 Id. at 1333.
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would constitute leveraging is quite narrow given the court's outright
dismissal of Princo's allegations. 7 The alleged agreement in Princo was
based on concerted efforts-a horizontal agreement among competitors."8
These agreements are generally "treated much more harshly under
the antitrust laws because they can facilitate collusion or, in the case of
technology, keep superior products or processes off the market."' 9 The
majority even recognized that Princo's brief contained allegations of
Philips's leveraging of the Raaymakers patents. 9° But, the en banc majority
rejected the sufficiency of these allegations. 91 Therefore, the question
becomes what would be sufficient to establish that the patents were in fact
inappropriately leveraged under the Federal Circuit's new standard?
A. The Princo Holding Must Be Reversed Because It Establishes an Almost
InsurmountableLegal Standard.
The most interesting aspect of Princo is the visible impact of the
Orange Book standards and the alleged suppression of the Lagadec patent
on the modern media storage industry. The Federal Circuit dismisses the
possibility that the Lagadec patent could have had any impact on the
industry because the Lagadec patent "d[id] not work well according to
the Orange Book standards," was "prone to errors[,] and 'did not provide a
scheme that would work and was reliable."' 92 It seems both the ITC and
Federal Circuit believe themselves capable of predicting whether a patent
encompassing new and innovative technology, whose testing is only in the
preliminary stages of commercialization, will ultimately be successful.93
Princo yields a distressing conclusion: if a patentee can suppress a
competitor's technology prior to its final development and successful
deployment into the relevant market-thus preventing the technology
87 Seeid. at 1331-32.
88 See id. at 1331.
89 Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, Concerted Refusals to License Intellectual
Property Rights, I HARv Bus. L. REV. ONLINE 21, 21 (2011) (internal citations omitted); see, e.g.,
Allied Tube, Inc. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988) (holding producers' agreement to
exclude innovation from the industry to constitute an antitrust violation).
90 See Princo Corp., 616 E3d at 1332. In particular, the majority stated that Princo alleged
that Philips leveraged the Raaymakers patents in such a way as to encourage Sony to forego
further development or independent licensing of the Lgadec patent in exchange for royalties
derived from the licensing of the Raaymakers patents. Id.
91 Seeid.
92 Princo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 616 F3d 1318, 1337 (Fed. Cir. aOlO) (en banc),
cert.denied, 131 S. Ct. 248o.(201 I).
93 Id. at 1338-39. The author finds this most interesting given the recent developments
in digital technology that have taken the technology industry by storm, as well as the general
phase-out of general analog technology. It appears that the current state of the industry requires one to question whether the Lagadec patent could have been a viable alternative, and
ultimately a superior, product to the Raaymakers patents.
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from being established as a viable alternative competing product-then
the patentee can successfully land in a safe haven free from any claim
of misuse. 4 Courts will instead turn a blind eye to this abusive conduct,
despite the clear existence of leveraging to "increase" the scope of the
patent.
If the Princo majority's logic were plausible, how would any defendant
ever successfully establish misuse unless the plaintiff alleging infringement
responded with an admission that he suppressed the technology with the
purpose ofeliminating competition in the marketplace? Applying this court's
reasoning, no party could ever prove that any technology would develop
into a viable alternative. One author noted the same: "Unless a new type
of recordable or re-writable compact disc is backwards compatible with
recorded and computer drive units already installed in the marketplace,
it would not be expected to compete effectively.""5 The dissent also
highlighted this same flaw, stating that the "probable commercial validity"
test adopted by the Princo majority has no support in prior precedent and
96
has previously been rejected in both antitrust and misuse cases.
This argument is not to deny the usefulness of patent pools and joint
ventures that the Federal Circuit clearly feels the need to protect. 97 As
best stated by the court, "Collaboration for the purpose of developing
and commercializing new technology can result in economies of scale
and integrations of complementary capacities that reduce costs, facilitate
innovation, eliminate duplication of effort and assets, and share risks that
no individual member would be willing to undertake alone ....
There
is a stark difference, however, between pooling patents to develop an
industry through mutually agreeable and beneficial standards and outright,
purposeful suppression of competing technology.99 Even Philips's counsel
"98

94 The dissent in Pninco was incensed by the holding and the resulting emasculation of
the patent misuse defense, finding that it ran counter to Supreme Court precedent. See id. at
1343 (Dyk, J., dissenting) ("Contrary to the majority, the Supreme Court cases establish that
license agreements that suppress alternative technologies can constitute misuse of the patents
for the protected technology, and the regional circuits have agreed."). The suppression of
technology that the Princo ruling allows directly contradicts "the unexceptional proposition
that patent licensing schemes are illegal where they are used as part of a broader effort to fix
prices and restrict competition." HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 27, § 3.3.
95 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ETAL.,supra note 27, § 3.3.
96 Pnnco Corp., 616 F3d at 1356 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,
309-10 (1949) (rejecting the requirement that a party proffer proof of the effect of unlawful
practices in the antitrust context because it would be nearly impossible to meet); Berlenbach
v.Anderson & Thompson Ski Co., 329 Fzd 782 (9th Cir. 1964)).
97 See Love & Kulbaski, supra note j8 ("The ruling by the CAFC has shown that the
CAFC recognizes the significant benefits provided by patent pooling agreements even to the
point of promoting their use .... ").
98 PrincoCorp., 616 E3d at 1335.
99 It has been suggested that the patent system in its current form itself is partially to
blame for encouraging companies to agree to noncompetitive arrangements and discourag-
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admitted that there would be no pro-competitive aspects that would save
two competitors' agreement to suppress competing technology as alleged
by Princo.' ° The majority, however, seemed to disagree, or at least to lack
measurable concern.
B. ,The PatentMisuse Doctrine is an Extension of the Doctrine of Unclean Hands
and Therefore Should Reflect the Same Standard.
Patent misuse is derived from the doctrine of unclean hands. 10
Unclean hands stands for the proposition that a plaintiff whose actions are
"illegal[], . . . inequitable, unconscionable, or [performed in] bad faith,"
in "connect[ion] to the case" should be barred from the court's relief on
principles of fairness.102
Unclean hands was developed "not as a protection to the defendant, but
as a disability to the plaintiffl. )" °3 In order for a plaintiff to be estopped,
unclean hands requires that the action simply be relevant or attributedto a
currentaction-generaldemeanor or actions will not support an application
of the doctrine. °4 The standard of relevancy that applies to unclean hands

ing innovatidn. For a unique perspective on this issue and its relation to the patent misuse
doctrine, see Mark A. Lemley, The Economic Irrationalityof the PatentMisuse Doctrine, 78 CALIF.
L. REV. 1599, 1614 (1990) (arguing that receiving a patent only for it to be held unenforceable
under the patent misuse doctrine makes the inventor worse off than if they had not ever
pursued a patent).
io See PrincoI, supra note 23, at 1315.
1o Bensen, supra note 5; see also U.S. Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. at 495 (stating patent misuse
"is an extension of the equitable doctrine of 'unclean hands' to the patent field").
102 T. Leigh Anenson, LimitingLegal Remedies:An Analysis of Unclean Hands,99 Ky. L.J. 63,
64 (zo I I); see also Keystone Driller Co. v.Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933) ("[W]
henever a party who, as actor, seeks to set the judicial machinery in motion and obtain some
remedy, [and] has violated conscience, or good faith, or other equitable principle, in his prior
conduct, [will find] the doors of the court... shut against him...."); Eresch v. Braecklein, 133
F.zd 12, 14 (ioth Cir. 1943) ("It is well settled that it is only fraud or willful misconduct which
bars one from recovering in a court of equity under the maxim, '[hle who comes into equity
must come with clean hands.' The maxim refers to willful misconduct rather than merely
negligent misconduct." (citing 20 C.J.S. Equity § 95a (1936)).
103 Farino v. Farino, 450 N.Y.S.2d 593, 594 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (citing Reiner v. N. Am.
Newspaper Alliance, 259 N.Y. 250, 256 (N.Y 1932)); see Word v. Remick, 58 S.W.3d 422, 426
(Ark. Ct. App. 2oo1) ("[Unclean hands] is not applied to favor a defendant.., but instead is
invoked in the interest of the public on grounds of public policy and for the protection of the
integrity of the court."). It has also been suggested that the doctrine of unclean hands acts as
a punitive measure against the plaintiff engaged in wrongoing himself. See Busch v. Baker, 83
So. 704 (Fla. 1920).
IO4 See Anenson, supra note 102, at 64. Unclean hands has been generally applied only
to actions of the plaintiff "directly related to the very issues in litigation." Louis ALTMAN &
MALLA POLLACK, CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 23.17

(4th ed. 2010); see Flow Control Indus., Inc. v. AMHI, Inc., 278 E Supp. 2d 1193, 1198 (W.D.
Wash. 2003).
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appears to be very different from that applied in patent misuse cases by
the Federal Circuit, despite the fact that the one doctrine is derived from
the other. 105

As previously noted, the en banc majority in Princo based its opinion
on the rationale that the Lagadec patent was not the patent in suit, and
therefore could not be the basis for a successful misuse allegation because
the Lagadec patent was not leveraged by Philips. 116 This was despite the
en banc panel's recognition that Princo made allegations that Philips was in
fact leveraging the Raaymakers patents to suppress the Lagadec technology.
As also discussed, the leveraging standard has no basis in Supreme Court
precedent; instead, it is a product of the Federal Circuit.
Rather than developing and applying this new standard, the Federal
Circuit should merely look to the source of the patent misuse doctrine for
the appropriate standard to apply.This would lead courts to the "relevancy"
standard applied in cases where unclean hands is pled as an affirmative
defense. This application of the patent misuse doctrine would encompass
all conduct relevant to the subject matter of the case, such as conduct
properly attributed to any patent in a tying agreement, not just the patent
in suit." 7 This is appropriate considering that often many patents are "part
and parcel" of the same course of conduct, rather than just the mere patent
in suit. 108Thus, as applied in Princo, the Lagadec patent would be relevant
in a suit brought to enforce the Raaymakers patents. It is nonsensical that
one patent would stand alone in an infringement action when it is being
marketed in a package of many patents to licensees."°
1o5 See, e.g., Richdel, Inc. v. Sunspool Corp., 714 Fzd 1573, 158o (Fed. Cir. 1983) (finding
that once the patent in suit was deemed invalid, there was no longer any reason to consider
the issue of patent misuse); Eversharp, Inc. v. Fisher Pen Co., 204 F.Supp. 649, 674 (N.D. Ill.
1961) ("The defense of patent misuse is available only where there has been a misuse of the
patents in suit.").
io6 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
107 Under the more expansive unclean hands standard, a patent in a tying agreement
would be vulnerable to a patent misuse defense because defendants would only have to show
that the patent in the tying agreement bears some relation to the patent in suit, rather than
actually being the patent in suit, in order to apply the patent misuse doctrine. See Slidell, Inc.
v. Millennium Inorganic Chems., Inc., 460 F.3d 1047, 1058 (8th Cir. 2oo6) (finding that, for
unclean hands to apply, the "inequitable conduct must bear some relation to the merits of
the case").
1o8 See Joe Westbrook, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 419 F Supp. 824,835 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (holding that the "Chrysler-Plymouth trademark [was not] a separate tying product, but rather, part
and parcel of the" whole). In fact, this is one argument that the dissent in Princo relies upon
in their assertion that the Raaymakers and Lagadec patents should be considered as one in
an action for infringement because the agreement by Sony and Philips was with regards to
both patents, not only the Raaymakers patents. Princo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 616 E3d
1318, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2oo) (en banc) (Dyk, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 248o (2011).
Additionally, the dissent in Princo took the position that patents in pooling agreements were
also "part and parcel" to the patent in suit. See id. at 1348-49.
i9 See Princo Corp., 616 F3d at 1348 (describing the agreement that jointly suppresses
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Originally, in order to establish the misuse defense, the alleged infringer
need not show that he individually suffered harm by the activity"10 -the
defendant need only establish that the plaintiff had engaged in wrongful
conduct associated with the patent.111 Courts have also accepted that
inequitable conduct outside of the licensing activity itself or the scope of the
patent in suit can establish the misuse defense."' Therefore, the Federal
Circuit should cease its narrowing of the misuse doctrine's application and
return the doctrine's strength to its prior state. This can be accomplished if
the Federal Circuit adopts the appropriate standard for misuse cases, which
should be the same standard applied to the doctrine of unclean hands.
C. Courts Should Adopt a More Expansive Doctrine to Rein In Intellectual
Property LicensingPracticesand EnsureCompliance with the U.S. Constitution.
Allowing such anticompetitive concerted action to continue unchecked
by intellectual property law stifles the development of technology, which in
turn undermines the express purpose of the Patent Clause." 3 By allowing a
Princo-type agreement to go unexamined, the Federal Circuit affords other
co-conspirators the opportunity to suppress technology within their own
fields.' 4 This directly contradicts our forefather's intention of facilitating
progress in the fields of art and science as enumerated in the Patent
Clause."'
As discussed supra, the Princo majority opinion has been described
as "emasculating" the patent misuse doctrine, rendering it superfluous
against the antitrust law regime." 6 Some scholars have indicated their
Lagadec technology and allowed the successful marketing of Raaymaker Technology).
1 I0 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.04 (2010); see Morton Salt Co. v. G. S.
Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942) (stating "the successful prosecution of an infringement
suit even against one who is not a competitor in such sale is a powerful aid to the maintenance
of the attempted monopoly of the unpatented article"); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 9 11
F.2d 970,979 (4th Cir. 199o) ("[Alnalogizing to patent misuse, the defense of copyright misuse
is available even if the defendants themselves have not been injured by the misuse.").
i i i See Mercoid Corp. v.'Mid-Continent Inv. CO., 320 U.S. 661, 669-70 (1944) (finding
that, because of the public's interest in preventing wrongful conduct through the misuse defense, defendant is not barred by resjudicatafrom relying upon the defense); Morton Salt Co.,
314 U.S. at 494 (finding that the plaintiff's "conduct... disqualifies him [from] maintain[ing]
the suit .... ); B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495,498 (1942) (holding that the right to enforce
a patent can be regained once the improper practice is abandoned).
112 See CHISUM, supranote 110, § 19.0415] n.2.
113 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts..
(emphasis added)).
114 Bohannan & Hovenkamp, supra note 89, at 23 (noting that "[b]lanket legality for
concerted refusals to license patenfs, and unused patents in particular, would have serious
implications for competition and innovation").
115 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
1I6 See supra Part I; see also USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 51I (7th. Cir.
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desire for a narrowing of the doctrine, or at least additional clarity." 7 Others
have criticized the doctrine, advocating for a limitation of its application to
18
the realm of antitrust law."
Some argue, however, for a much broader application of the patent
misuse doctrine, allowing misuse to be a form of foreclosure on intellectual
property rights." 9 In particular, Bohannan argues that intellectual property
is in desperate need of a "coherent misuse doctrine, grounded in IP policy,
to prevent overreaching by patent and copyright holders."' 0 After Princo,
the misuse doctrine will not provide for appropriate redress, specifically in
instances where there is a violation of only intellectual property law, and
2
not antitrust law.'
1982) ("Since the antitrust laws as currently interpreted reach every practice that could impair
competition substantially, it is not easy to define a separate role for a doctrine also designed to
prevent an anticompetitive practice-the abuse of a patent monopoly.").
1 7 The trend towards achieving clarity has always been at the forefront of case law surrounding the patent misuse doctrine, which is one of the reasons that the misuse doctrine is
heavily grounded in antitrust law, as opposed to IP policy. See Bohannan, supranote 2, at 477.
For examples of applications of antitrust law in patent misuse cases, see, e.g., United States
v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Morton
Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
i18 Lemley, supra note 99, at 1628. But the assertion that the patent misuse doctrine
should not exist outside of the antitrust laws seems most interesting given that the doctrine
was initially developed apart, and distinct, from antitrust law. See Jere M. Webb & Lawrence
A. Locke, Intellectual Property Misuse: Developments in the Misuse Doctrine, 4 HALv. J.L & TcH.
257, 262 (1991). The misuse doctrine was once reserved only for intellectual property lawyers
and scholars; however, as Webb and Locke have observed, the expansion of the misuse doctrine within the field of intellectual property and concurrent changes in antitrust law have led
many scholars and even courts to question whether the misuse doctrine has any continued
viability apart from antitrust law. Id. at 264. Consider, for example, the following statement of
Judge Posner: "If misuse claims are not tested by conventional antitrust principles, by what
principles shall they be tested?" USM Corp., 694 F2d at 512 (concluding that misuse in fact
must be tested by antitrust principles).
19 Bohannan, supra note 2, at 475. Surprisingly, this stance is not entirely new and highlights the rising tension between the antitrust regime and patent law. "The misuse doctrine..
. should remain a viable, equitable doctrine, distinct from antitrust principles and analysis, because antitrust and misuse principles address different policy considerations." Webb & Locke,
supra note 118, at 264 (pointing out that the misuse doctrine is concerned with discouraging
exploitation of patented property by the IP owners and distinguishing this from antitrust laws
by arguing that antitrust laws are concerned more with "injury to the market environment").
Critics of the misuse doctrine, however, maintain that without considering antitrust policies in
reference to the misuse doctrine, there will be less incentive to innovate. Id. It is important to
connect this perspective to the fundamental idea that "the primary purpose of [federal] patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents but is 'to promote the
progress of science and useful arts."' Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.,
243 U.S. 502, 511 (917) (citing U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8); see also Lemley, supranote 99, at
1628 (suggesting that "the differences between the patent misuse doctrine and the antitrust
laws justify the continued existence of both").
i 2o Bohannan, supra note 2, at 525.
121 Id. at 526.
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Misuse should be applied under a broader standard to rein in practices
of patent owners and prevent the "foreclosure of competition, innovation,
or access to the public domain."'' 2 This wide application of the misuse
doctrine will ensure that owners are not using their rights to violate the
underlying policies of intellectual property law and the Patent Clause of the
US Constitution. Bohannan's argument for this expansive misuse doctrine
is grounded in the Court's earlier opinions, which demonstrated "a strong
concern, grounded in intellectualpropertypolity, for limiting 'monopoly' rights
over intellectual property."'2 3 This concern is separate and distinct from
that of the Princomajority's, which emphasized antitrust policies including
"price and output effect of monopolistic conduct."'2 4
Logically, a doctrine born of intellectual property law, with ancillary
ties to antitrust law, should be based on intellectual property doctrines
and policies-not antitrust. In addition, the doctrine should be upheld
and applied by courts to ensure that the clear and express language of the
United States Constitution is being enforced.
CONCLUSION

The courts are currently at a crossroads with the doctrine of patent
2
misuse."
' The Federal Circuit's decision decimated the existence of an
expansive doctrine by focusing the application of the misuse doctrine on
an inappropriate "leveraging" standard. This standard directly contradicts
Supreme Court precedent and appears insurmountable, particularly given
Princo's specific allegations. This fate is untenable given the period in
which the patent misuse doctrine was created, the considerable expansion

122 Id.
123 Id. at 497. The underlying policies of intellectual property focus on "potential effects
on innovation and access to the public domain." Id.
124 Compare Princo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 616 F3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2oo) (en
banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 248o (2o i),.with Bohannan, supranote 2, at 497.
125 See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys. Inc., 157 F3d 134o, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Although
the defense of patent misuse indeed evolved to protect against 'wrongful' use of patents, the
catalog of practices labelled [sic] 'patent misuse' does not include a general notion of'wrongful' use."); see also Kolene Corp. v. Motor City Metal Treating, Inc., 44o E2d 77, 84-85 (6th
Cit. 1971) (explaining that the misuse must be of the patent in suit and that "lain antitrust
offense does not necessarily amount to misuse merely because it involves patented products
or products which are the subject of a patented process"); McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 395 E2d 230, 238-39 (Ioth Cir. 1968) (noting that the defense of patent misuse
has been allowed "only where there had been a misuse of the patent in suit"). ContraZenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. io (1969) (holding that "conditioning the
grant of a patent license upon payment of royalties on products which do not use the teaching
of the patent does amount to patent misuse."); Compton v. Metal Prods., Inc., 453 F.2d 38, 46
(4th Cir. 1971) (holding that patent misuse occurred and that the patent was unenforceable
when the patentee agreed, to limit his own freedom of action by entering into agreement to
not compete for twenty years).
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for which the Supreme Court is responsible, and the policies underlying
the doctrine.
The patent misuse doctrine is derived from the doctrine of unclean
hands; therefore, it is logical that the patent misuse doctrine would be best
served by adopting the same standard that applies to unclean hands, a
"relevant to the underlying action" standard. This would work to harmonize
the two doctrines and would also allow courts to rein in abusive conduct
associated with intellectual property laws, ensuring that those obtaining
intellectual property rights are not inhibiting progress and innovation.

